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*J.B.L. 394 This article addresses the possible effects of the REACH Regulation (R1907/2006) on
the autonomous contractual relationships of sellers, buyers, insurers and financiers of goods
throughout the EEA and the consequent uncertainties arising (not least by contractual illegality) for
such parties.
Introduction
REACH,1 as an EC legislative instrument in the form of a community regulation, is directly applicable2
in the national domestic laws of each of the 30 states3 in the European Economic Area (EEA).
REACH now takes effect within the context of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(TFEU) and the Treaty on European Union (TEU), both of which entered into force under the Treaty
of Lisbon on December 1, 2009 and replace, as from that date, the prior governing Treaties of the
European Union (EU). REACH prohibits the placing of registrable substances, on their own, or in
preparations or articles, on the market in the EEA unless they have been registered and, when
required, their use authorised in accordance with REACH. It also places obligations on sellers and
buyers of such substances (or of preparations--and in certain circumstances even articles containing
them) to pass product, risk and use information both up and down the supply chain and also to the
European Chemicals Agency (ECHA), which is effectively responsible for managing the registration,
authorisation and restriction process across the EEA and for co-ordinating the implementation of
REACH by the EEA states. REACH has the capacity4 to have direct effects on the rights and duties of
parties buying and selling within, and into, the EEA. While subject to *J.B.L. 395 certain transitional
provisions until June 1, 2018, REACH entered into force on June 1, 2007. The REACH art.3
definitions of “substance”, “preparation” and “article” are so broad as to bring within their scope all
goods.5 Clearly then, save as expressly excepted from REACH,6 the provisions of REACH must be
considered in the context of any contract for the sale and purchase of goods. While manufacturers,
exporters, importers and downstream users7 must struggle to ensure compliance in their own and
their trading partners' business practices, lawyers must address how the statutory prohibitions and
duties imposed by REACH will operate in the context of sale and purchase arrangements. This article
explores, in the absence of any clear direction in the REACH legislation,8 the contrasting effects on
autonomous contractual relationships of statutory duties under EU and UK legislation, and how
non-compliance with REACH might, under English law (or alternative applicable EEA domestic laws),
undermine the legal certainty parties endeavour to achieve in such relationships.
Purpose of REACH
It is important to take the underlying purposes of any EU legislation as the starting point for any
inquiry as to its effect and, only once those purposes are understood, to then go on to consider the
operative legislative provisions against those intended purposes. The reason for this lies in the
adoption by the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) of a teleological approach to the
interpretation of EU legislation, an approach which the ECJ has described in the following terms:
“… [I]t is not sufficient for the court to adopt the literal interpretation and the court considers it
necessary to examine the question whether this interpretation is confirmed by other criteria
concerning in particular the common intention of the high contracting parties and the ratio legis …”9
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Accordingly, it is necessary to first identify the fundamental aims of the REACH legislation.
Unfortunately, this is not a straightforward exercise, since it is evident from the 131-paragraph
Preamble to the legislation that the aims of REACH are broad, several and conflicting. Significantly, in
industrial supply chains, aims include the following: the protection, variously, of human health, the
environment and the free movement of goods in the single market; the systematic conveying of
information as to substance composition, use and hazards through industrial supply chains; and the
placing of risk management responsibility on those who *J.B.L. 396 manufacture, import, place on
the market or use substances.10 Paragraph 77 of the Preamble expressly acknowledges that flexibility
is required over compliance deadlines, particularly in relation to the authorisation procedure. This is
significant as the legislation only provides an outline registration and authorisation framework for
substance registration and use authorisation. It is the importers, manufacturers, downstream users
and suppliers affected by the legislation that are primarily responsible for identifying registration
categories, product risk and use information throughout and beyond the 10-year transitional period.
Implementation of REACH
The extended transitional period arises because art.23 provides that substances satisfying certain
specified criteria,11 being directed at identifying substances already lawfully on the EEA market,12
benefit from extended registration deadlines provided they were pre-registered with ECHA, pursuant
to REACH art.28,13 between June 1 and December 1, 2008. The extended deadlines are to
December 1, 2010, June 1, 2013, or June 1, 2018 depending upon the substance risk category and
the tonnage manufactured in, or imported into, the EEA. Every manufacturer or importer who wished
to take advantage of the extended transitional period in respect of their prior and continuing
substance manufacture within, or substance supply into, the EEA market had the obligation to
pre-register those substances before December 1, 2008. Article 29 provides that every potential
registrant, downstream user and third party submitting information to ECHA pursuant to the
pre-registration procedure will have become participants in the substance information exchange
forum (SIEF) for that particular substance, or group of substances, which was the subject of such
pre-registration procedures. The purpose of the SIEFs, as set out in REACH art.29(2), is to facilitate
the exchange of information for the purposes of both the compilation of the essential registration
documents (i.e. the technical dossier including guidance as to the safe use of the substance and any
required chemical safety report required for registration under REACH art. 10) and the elimination of
any differences between potential registrants as to classification and labelling requirements. Only
following registration does the onus move on to ECHA to verify compliance with registration
requirements and to evaluate whether there is any need for any use of the substance to be subject to
the authorisation procedure or for the substance itself to be made subject to any restriction.
In the meantime, as from December 1, 2008, substances that are registrable but have not been
pre-registered (whether by them not being phase-in substances as defined by REACH art. 3 or by
simple omission) become subject to the various prohibitions and information obligations arising
pursuant to REACH. Prior to considering the extent and effect of those prohibitions and obligations it
is *J.B.L. 397 appropriate to consider what substances are excluded from the broad scope of the
REACH art.3 definitions of “substances”, “preparations” or “articles”. Some goods are entirely
exempted by art. 2 from falling within the ambit of REACH owing to a variety of reasons, such as: they
are regulated under other EU regulatory regimes (e.g. “waste”)14 ; they are destined for uses that are
regulated under other EU regulatory regimes15 ; or they are simply part of the production process (e.g.
non-isolated intermediates).16 Other goods have partial exemption from the requirements of
substance registration, evaluation or authorisation on the basis that they are included in Annex IV as
substances considered to cause minimum risk,17 or from registration on the basis that they are
included in Annex V as substances for which registration is deemed inappropriate or unnecessary
and their exemption does not prejudice the objectives of REACH18 or are on-site isolated
intermediates, transported isolated intermediates or polymers.19
The legislation is rendered complex not only by the difficulty in applying these defined terms to
particular substances (requiring analysis both of chemical composition and, in some cases, the
process of production) but also by reason of the interaction of the definitions with each other when
considering whether such particular substances are included, excluded or only partially excluded from
REACH. An obvious instance of interaction between inclusion and exclusion is that of waste collected
for recycling, which clearly falls within the scope of the exclusion for “waste” as defined by reference
to Directive 2006/12,20 but which once recycled and supplied for reprocessing or packaging emerges
back out of the exclusion to be caught by the overarching definitions of “substances” and
“preparations”. The exclusion of “polymers” is a good illustration of the complexity arising from partial
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exclusion, since, while polymers are themselves excluded from registration, the monomers and
additives incorporated in the polymer must themselves be registered by the manufacturer or importer
of the polymer.
While the definition of “articles” is as broad and encompassing as those of “substances” and
“preparations”, the prohibitions and obligations arising in connection with articles are significantly
reduced. Substances in articles only require registration when the substance is “intended to be
released under normal or reasonably foreseeable conditions of use” and exceeds one tonne per
producer or importer per year as so provided by art.7(1). Of course, the questions of what an “article”,
“intended” release and “normal or reasonably foreseeable” use are, await definitive interpretation by
the EU Courts. In the meantime ECHA has *J.B.L. 398 produced guidance addressing these issues.
21 The guidance seeks to differentiate an “article” from any container which simply contains
substances (e.g. printer cartridges or ink pens) and to differentiate “intentional release” from any
release in normal use which is not functional. ECHA clearly wishes to restrict the requirements of
substance registration in relation to “articles”, to those objects releasing substances for some ancillary
function intended by the supplier and/or required by the recipient, not being the primary function of the
object (e.g. perfumed towels releasing scent when used for their primary drying function22 ; by
analogy, perhaps also plastic bags sold with the promise of bio-degradability or oxo-degradability
depending upon the chemistry of their bio- or oxo-degradation). This construction of the word “article”
appears to be rather strained, as even ECHA appears to acknowledge.23 To what extent the EU
Courts will adopt this strained interpretation remains to be seen. Assuming they do, goods comprising
“articles” are most unlikely to be subject to the registration process. However, where the article
comprises a container containing a “substance” on its own or in a “preparation” (e.g. a brake cylinder
containing brake fluid, another hydraulic system containing fluid, or a printer cartridge containing ink),
then the substance will need to be registered, and the use of such substances may require
authorisation under REACH. In any event (as discussed below under the heading “REACH
information obligations”) the supply of certain articles will, by reason of their chemical composition,
attract statutory notification obligations.
Consequently the performance of contractual supply obligations arising in contracts for the sale and
purchase of goods within or into the EEA will need to take account of statutory duties imposed by
REACH--unless, of course, the goods to which the contract relates are specifically excluded by
REACH. Many of these statutory duties appear to be capable of having a profound effect on the rights
and duties of contracting parties within the various national domestic law systems of the EEA.
Prohibitions and obligations imposed by REACH
EU legislation operates within those EEA national legal systems as overarching legislative
instruments capable of having primacy24 over national law, with the result that a national court within
the EEA is obliged to give full effect to such EU legislation in all proceedings before it (including in
proceedings for the enforcement of arbitral awards),25 even to the extent of suspending, or setting
aside, its own *J.B.L. 399 national law rules.26 The difficulty is that not all EU legislative provisions
have direct effect within national legal systems and only in the event that such legislation has direct
effect will it be considered supreme to national law. In the absence of direction by the Community
legislature the direct effect of any EU legislation is left to be determined by the EU Courts on a
case-by-case basis under the ad hoc referral system operating under TFEU art.267 (ex EC art.234).
By this system, particular issues of EU law (as and when they require determination in connection
with litigation before national courts) may be referred to the EU Courts for a definitive ruling; however,
the EU Courts decline to accept references unless their legal and factual context is clear27 and the
question arises out of an actual, and not a hypothetical, dispute.28
Over the last 40 years since the principle of “direct effects” was first established by the EU Courts,29
they have established certain recognisable criteria for such direct effects (i.e. that the legislation
satisfies the following requirements: it is of a type that is capable of giving rise to direct effects; it
confers rights on individuals--including businesses--and corresponding duties; and that such duties
imposed by it both satisfy the justiciability requirements of being clear, precise and unconditional and
are capable of being enforceable before national courts in the manner contended for by the claimant).
30 In order to assess the approach likely to be taken by the EU Courts as to the direct effect of the
various legislative provisions of REACH within the EEA national legal systems, it is necessary to
address those statutory provisions as against the above criteria. Although, of course, the EU Courts
will only have the opportunity of determining such issues in the context of EU law questions referred
to them by national courts.31
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An EU Regulation, such as REACH, is a one-size-fits-all legislative measure applying throughout the
EU which is certainly capable of giving rise to direct effects.32 It has neither need of transposition into
national law nor any conditionality as to its effect, other than insofar as the EU Regulation itself
provides for such conditionality.33 As A.G. Geelhoed made clear in the Opinion delivered in the Muñoz
case, not all provisions in EU Regulations have direct effect. Rather it needs to be inquired, in respect
of each particular provision and in the context of a particular dispute, whether or not: the provision
protects a class having a particular interest34 (e.g. traders in competition with each other); the
claimant falls within that class; and protection is sought in respect of the particular interest the EU
*J.B.L. 400 legislation seeks to protect (e.g. exchange of product, risk and use information along
supply chains). The case of Muõz concerned art.3(1) of Regulation 1035/72, which prohibited the
marketing of horticultural products under certain trade names that had been attached to products
fulfilling certain sale quality standards (in this case “superior seedless grapes”). The ECJ held that this
prohibition gave rise to an enforceable right at the suit of a competitor to obtain a civil court order to
stop any infringement. In its judgment the ECJ justified its decision that the prohibition did give rise to
such an enforceable duty at the suit of a competitor on the basis that the “regulations operate to
confer rights on individuals which the national courts have a duty to protect” and that
“… the full effectiveness of the rules on quality standards and, in particular, the practical effect of the
obligation laid down by Article 3(1) … imply that it must be possible to enforce that obligation by
means of civil proceedings instituted by a trader against a competitor.”35
It should be noted that in this case the relevant UK authority, the Horticultural Marketing Inspectorate,
had failed to take action to enforce the regulation, and the case might yet be seen as a high-water
mark for the direct effect of EU law in civil disputes between non-contracting parties.36
The outcome of the teleological interpretative inquiry to be undertaken by the EU Courts when they
come to address the effect of REACH is difficult to predict. The Preamble to REACH does make it
abundantly clear that the purpose of the legislation is to protect a diverse range of economic and
environmental interests operating between the state and industry, within industrial supply chains and
between industry and consumers.37 The achievement of many of the aims of REACH can be seen to
be fundamental to the central purposes of the European Union as described in the TFEU, particularly
those purposes directed to the protection of the environment, the competitiveness of EU industry,
health and consumer protection.38 Accordingly, there is a clear linkage between the achievement of
the aims and purposes of the TFEU, the REACH legislation and the operation of industrial supply
chains. Given that linkage, there seems little reason to doubt that the EU Courts will conclude (as and
when opportunity for definitive interpretation arises) that REACH--or rather some of the statutory
duties imposed by REACH--may have direct effect, at least in some circumstances. Assuming
continued incremental development of EU law in this area by TFEU art.267 (ex EC art.234)
procedure, rather than by further legislation; such direct effect will *J.B.L. 401 only ever be
considered by the EU Courts in the context of those particular issues, related disputes, contractual
relationships and industrial supply chains that are the subject of national court references to them.
However, even in the absence of those particular contexts, it is possible to address certain duties
imposed by REACH in entirely abstract terms and consider to what extent they satisfy the justiciability
requirements arising under EU law: namely those of sufficient clarity in the legislative provision,
sufficient precision in the imposed obligation and the absence of any conditionality in its imposition. In
addressing REACH on this abstract basis, it would appear that the provisions most likely to have a
significant impact within a contractual context involving the buying and selling of goods are those
provisions prohibiting the sale of certain goods (the REACH prohibitions) and those provisions
requiring the provision of information up and down the supply chain (the REACH information
obligations).
Reach prohibitions
The REACH prohibitions are capable of arising in three distinct situations.
First, substances requiring registration are prohibited by REACH art. 5 from being placed on the EEA
market in the absence of registration. The prohibition at art. 5 against registrable substances on their
own, in preparations or in articles being “placed on the market” unless registered pursuant to REACH
can be seen to clearly affect supply contracts when account is taken of the definitions. The phrase
“placing on the market” is defined by art. 3 as being the activities either of “supplying or making
available … [to a] … third party” inside the EEA or of importation into the EEA. While perhaps
susceptible to a literal interpretation that only supply and not purchase is prohibited, it does appear to
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be a general prohibition imposed on everyone. Notwithstanding the general nature of the prohibition,
the obligation to register is only placed on those certain parties established within the EEA who
manufacture the relevant substance, or produce the relevant article, in the EEA or are responsible for
their importation into the EEA. The registration obligations on those parties are set out at arts 6-24 of
REACH and require manufacturers, producers and importers to provide, for substance registration,
certain information to ECHA within a technical dossier and, where required by art. 14 of REACH, a
chemical safety report.39 As the general prohibition at art.5 requires registration to be “in accordance
with the relevant provisions” of REACH the possibility arises that some want of compliance in the
provision of information to ECHA (e.g. by the omission of required information or the submission of
incorrect information by those manufacturers, producers and importers having the statutory obligation
of registration) could give rise to the general prohibition notwithstanding an apparent, though flawed,
registration. REACH is silent as to this apparent possibility, but the nature and range of the
information to be covered by the technical dossier (and particularly any required chemical safety
report) is such that the risk of inaccuracy in submissions to ECHA is high. Consequently, the effect
*J.B.L. 402 of such inaccuracies on the validity of the registration is another issue awaiting some
definitive interpretation by the EU Courts, although it may be that the EU jurisprudence requiring EU
institutions (such as ECHA) to fulfil the legitimate expectations of persons relying on their decisions
will give some level of protection where registration should have been declined.40
Second, substances of very high concern (SVHC) are prohibited by REACH art.56 from being placed
on the EEA market for any use which has not been authorised “in accordance” with REACH. The
art.56 prohibition is only imposed on any “manufacturer, importer or downstream user” in the EEA,41
but again, by requiring authorisation in accordance with the authorisation procedures within REACH,
similar issues arise in relation to the art.56 prohibition to those arising above (i.e. as to whether
authorisation is “in accordance” with REACH where inaccurate or misleading information is provided
by the applicant--being a manufacturer, importer or downstream user--to ECHA for authorisation for a
particular use).
Third, substances which are made the subject of restrictions are prohibited by REACH art.67 from
being manufactured, placed on the market or used unless there is compliance with the restriction
conditions. Any prohibitions arising under art.67 by reason of restrictions being placed by ECHA on
certain substances, would, alike with the art. 5 prohibition, be generally applicable. The art.67
prohibition expressly prohibits substances from being “manufactured … placed on the market or
used” by anyone unless there is compliance “with the conditions of” the applicable restriction,
apparently irrespective of intent or knowledge of the conditions or of the chemical composition of the
goods being sold.
The REACH prohibitions would appear on their face to satisfy the requirement of clarity for direct
effects, but it is difficult not to be drawn to the conclusion that, even in the absence of conditionality,
the obligations will appear in particular circumstances to be imprecise. Absence of precision flows
from the conceptual structure of the regulation itself in that REACH purports to require all substances
(i.e. everything corporeal) to be registered and then excludes from registration substances which fall
within so many competing categories (i.e. as to general and particular composition, stage of
manufacturing process, use, tonnage, etc). Particular difficulties can certainly be anticipated in
respect of the following substances: substances constituting “waste” within Directive 2006/12 are
excluded from the ambit of REACH until such point as they cease to constitute such waste and
become recovered through recycling42 ; polymers (defined by reference to molecular composition,
rather than any polymeric production process) are excluded from registration or authorisation while
the monomer and other substances used to produce them are not43 ; substances used in medicinal
products for human or veterinary use44 or in food- or feeding-stuffs45 are excluded from registration or
*J.B.L. 403 authorisation, but only as to the extent of such use; no obligation to register arises at all
where substances are imported into, or manufactured in, the EEA in annual quantities below the
threshold of one tonne or more per year per manufacturer or per importer.46 As to this tonnage issue it
should be noted that higher thresholds initially apply to phase-in substances, but these higher
thresholds decrease over the transitional period.47 This prompts the immediate inquiry as to how a
downstream user or distributor purchasing small quantities (whose sale and purchase contracts would
ostensibly be subject to the art.5 prohibition) could possibly be expected to know whether or not there
has been compliance upstream. However, subject to such want of precision obstructing direct effects
in particular cases, the justiciability criteria would appear to be fulfilled by the REACH prohibitions,
which are clearly and unambiguously expressed and unconditional in nature.
Reach information obligations
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The REACH information obligations for the supply of information back and forth along the supply
chain (as distinct from the submission of information by manufacturers, importers and/or downstream
users to ECHA in connection with the processes of registration, authorisation and restriction)48 arise in
various distinct situations which can be generally dealt with in four categories. First, sellers and other
suppliers of substances (on their own or in preparations) are obliged to provide down the supply chain
limited technical information under art.3249 or (where the substances comprise substances which are
classified as dangerous, PBT, vPvB or SVHC)50 safety data sheets under art.31.51 Second, sellers
and other suppliers of articles containing SVHC above a certain concentration threshold52 have
particular obligations under art. 3 3 to give automatically to all recipients (other than consumers)53
sufficient information for safe use of the article “including, as a minimum,” the name of the SVHC.
Third, buyers and other recipients in supply chains who are manufacturers, importers or downstream
users54 are obliged under art.34 to pass up the supply chain information both as to “new” hazardous
properties and as to deficiencies in the risk management information (i.e. the information *J.B.L. 404
already passed downstream in safety data sheets). Fourth, buyers of such dangerous, PBT, vPvB, or
SVHC substances who are downstream users are obliged to provide use information up the supply
chain to their own suppliers, albeit only where those buyers elect to advise particular uses to their
supplier.55
This fourth category raises particular issues. Downstream users advising particular uses to their
supplier have obligations under art.37 to provide “sufficient information” for the supplier to prepare an
exposure scenario for that use. The supplier, if it is itself a downstream user, importer or
manufacturer, can either provide the requested exposure scenario or else pass on, further up along
the supply chain, the use information received. Article 37(3) gives the ultimate EEA manufacturer or
importer of the substance responsible for its registration a choice. It can either include that use, and
the relevant exposure scenario, as part of the chemical safety report information to be provided by it
to ECHA for the purposes of substance registration and use authorisation, or else it can decline to do
so “for reasons of protection of human health or the environment” and proceed to advise ECHA and
the downstream user accordingly. If it takes the latter option it must give written reasons without delay
to that downstream user. It cannot make any further supply to that downstream user unless it gives its
reasons for refusing to incorporate the proposed use in its existing substance registration and use
authorisation. The downstream user always has the option of proceeding itself to provide a chemical
safety report to ECHA in relation to any uses not appearing in its supplier's safety data sheet.
Again, while in concept these obligations appear to satisfy the justiciability requirement for direct
effect in terms of their clarity, there is a manifest want of precision as to what the detail of the
obligations will be in particular contexts. For instance, in the case of a sale of an “article” comprising
an old oil painting (e.g. the archetypal Rembrandt masterpiece), it could be contended that notice,
under REACH art.33, should be given of the existence of SVHCs--but to determine whether such
notice should be given, and what the contents of such notice should be, destructive testing would be
necessary. In the face of such an absurd interpretation the EU Courts are surely likely to conclude
that the obligation on the supplier is insufficiently precise to be capable of giving rise to direct effects
in that context. Similar issues arise in other contexts as to the extent of the duty on the person
required to provide information. For instance, REACH art.34 specifies in general terms the information
that needs to be supplied by any “actor in the supply chain” to “the next actor or distributor up the
supply chain”, but does not place any obligation on that party to discover, collate or verify the veracity
of such information or specify the means by which such information is to be communicated. Will the
negligent or reckless actor be able to escape the obligation by making no such inquiry? When a
supplier prepares and supplies an exposure scenario down the supply chain, following the receipt of
use information under REACH art. 37, how is liability to be apportioned for any consequent
inaccuracy in the exposure scenario attributable to underlying inaccuracy in the use information?
These issues suggest that in many particular circumstances the REACH information obligations
*J.B.L. 405 will be considered insufficiently precise to have direct effects within the context of the
national domestic law applicable to the contractual obligations agreed between the parties,
irrespective of their general capacity for direct effects in more straightforward circumstances (e.g.
where a supplier fails to provide safety data sheets despite a statutory obligation to do so).
Reach prohibitions and information obligations
To the extent that the REACH prohibitions and the REACH information obligations are accorded
direct effect by the EU Courts, such effects will be experienced within the various autonomous sale
and purchase contracts concluded along the particular supply chain for the substances and articles in
question. Non-compliance with REACH will mean breach by one or other of the relevant contracting
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parties (manufacturers-importers-downstream users-distributors) of an EU statutory duty that might
either prohibit transactions, or create liabilities within transactions, right along the entire length of the
particular supply chain. The effect of such statutory breach would need to be evaluated under each
particular contract subject to its own governing law, albeit, in the event that any dispute was
determined or enforced56 by jurisdictions within the EEA, only to the extent that such effect is
consistent with EU law.
The requirements of EU law as to the enforcement of EU legislation such as REACH are that there
be:
• equivalence57 in sanctions for breach of EU legislation--requiring procedural and substantive
equivalence to national law sanctions (whether public, private, criminal or civil) imposed for
“comparable infringements of like seriousness”58 of national law; and
•effectiveness59 in sanctions for breach of EU legislation--requiring that sanctions be effective, have
deterrent effect, and be proportionate.
Accordingly, the first inquiry is to analyse the effect of domestic statutory prohibitions and statutory
duties (such as those arising under REACH) under the governing laws of any contract,60 which, in the
context of this article, requires analysis under English law as to the effect that the REACH prohibitions
and the REACH information obligations would be likely to have had under English law had they been
imposed by domestic UK, rather than EU, legislation. In contrast to the teleological interpretative
approach required in relation to EU legislation, national English law would require a more literal
approach in the context of national *J.B.L. 406 UK legislation not deriving from EU law,61 and, given
the EU principle of equivalence already referred to, it is perhaps appropriate at first to address the
effects on autonomous contractual relationships of legislative interventions, such as REACH, under
this more literal approach.62 Traditionally English courts have interpreted statutory interventions as
having the following potential effects: the effect of rendering some contracts and/or the performance
of some contractual obligations illegal; the effect of informing the content of contractual and/or tortious
duties; and/or the effect of creating entirely new rights. It is appropriate to address the possible impact
of REACH under English law in each of these respects.
REACH potential for contractual illegality under English law
The first and overriding question posed by English law when addressing the effect of legislative
prohibitions in the context of contractual duties is whether the contract, as well as the act, is
prohibited.63 An affirmative answer can only be given in two categories of case. The first is where the
contract is illegal, because it is prohibited and could never be lawfully performed.64 The second is
where the contract could have been lawfully performed, but it was performed, or was to be performed,
in a manner which was prohibited.65 This second category sub-divides into circumstances where the
illegality only operates against the party performing, or intending to perform, the contract in a
prohibited manner,66 and circumstances where the illegality operates against all contracting parties
because there is an illegal conspiracy among them to perform the contract in a illegal manner (all of
them having, or having had, a common and fixed intention towards such illegal performance).67 An
inquiry as to the fact of illegality demands investigation both as to the scope of the statutory
prohibition and the nature of the contractual obligation to be performed. Such investigation involves
careful textual analysis of the legislative provision at issue,68 and factual inquiry of the contractual
context *J.B.L. 407 in which the allegation of illegality has arisen.69 English law does not generally
require criminal intent. It is the fact of the contravention of a statutory prohibition, irrespective of the
knowledge of that statutory prohibition and of its contravention, which will render contractual
performance illegal. Only in the case of intended future performance by illegal means of an otherwise
lawful contract would actual knowledge that the performance was prohibited be required for the
contract to be considered illegal.70
Against this framework, the REACH prohibitions at arts 5, 56 and 67 (arising, variously, in relation to:
unregistered registrable substances; unauthorised use of those substances subject to use
authorisation; and restricted substances) may be expected to give rise to the same issues of
contractual illegality in sale and purchase contracts as would arise in English law in the context of
domestic and foreign national prohibitions.71 English law has generated a clear principle that if goods
are prohibited from sale or purchase then any contract concluded for their sale and purchase will be
illegal.72 Would English law consider the Reach prohibitions to prohibit such contracts? Each of the
Reach prohibitions embraces “placing on the [EEA] market”. As previously explained, this is defined
as including “supplying or making available … [to a] … third party” or importing into the EEA. As any
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such supply or import is prohibited, then any agreement for such supply or importation will surely also
be illegal.73 Such illegality has the potential to cause considerable uncertainty in intentional supply
chains relating to goods subject to REACH.74
The issues are less obvious in connection with the REACH information obligations arising under arts
31-34 and 37-38, but illegality can arise under English law where goods, though not themselves
prohibited from sale, are sold without required accompanying information. One example of such a
case is Anderson v Daniel , where the sale of imported or processed fertiliser, unaccompanied by
information as to chemical composition, contrary to the Fertilisers and Feeding Stuffs Act 1906,
resulted in the contract being held illegal and the vendor being unable to sue the purchaser for the
price of the supplied fertiliser.75 Another example is Marles v Philip Trant & Sons Ltd , where a
merchant *J.B.L. 408 supplying seed to a farmer as “spring wheat” did not, in breach of the Seeds
Act 1920, give written particulars of the seed variety of the seed sold and the Court of Appeal (in the
course of considering the effect of such illegality) accepted that the merchant would have been
unable to sue the farmer for the price as the contract was unenforceable by reason of illegality.76 To
the extent that any REACH information obligations were accorded direct effect by the EU Courts,
would English law consider breach of any of them sufficient to render illegal the contracts of sale and
purchase to which any non-compliance related? This question can only be answered by addressing
whether, expressly or by implication, non-compliance with the obligation in question makes the supply
unlawful and prohibited. One possible example of such a provision under REACH is the obligation
imposed on a supplier by art.37(3). Pursuant to this provision, where a supplier has received
notification from a downstream user of a downstream use which the supplier refuses to include as an
identified use in the supplier's chemical safety report, the supplier must refrain from further supply to
that downstream user without providing reasons for such refusal. An example in a different context
would arise where substances are subject to restrictions requiring the exchange of further particular
information between contracting parties. Non-compliance with the conditions of such restrictions could
give rise to the art.67 prohibition. Apart from such particular provisions, it seems unlikely that failure to
provide information up and down the supply chain will result in contractual illegality, as no general
prohibition attaches to non-compliance with the REACH information obligations at arts 31-34 or
37-38, and the REACH prohibitions at arts 5, 56 and 67 are not obviously dependant on the supply of
such information.
Illegality operates under English law as a barrier to a private civil law claim. The barrier can be raised
by the court itself, but is generally raised by a litigant by way of defence. The barrier generally
operates to the prejudice of all contracting parties irrespective of fault and its effect is to render any
prohibited contract, or tainted contract (as discussed at 2. below), void and unenforceable to the
prejudice of all parties irrespective of responsibility for the non-compliance with the statutory
prohibition.77 It is only in the event of illegality in the performance by only one of the parties (the other
parties not intending or participating in such illegal conduct and the contract not itself being
prohibited) that the barrier might operate only to the prejudice of the party responsible for the illegal
performance. Once illegality is proven, the barrier operates in response to the following principles.
1. If a litigant is forced to rely on an illegal contract in asserting their case, then their case must fail by
reason of illegality whether their claim is in contract (for the price of the contractual supply, any
breach of warranty, or for analogous contractual claims such as for damages *J.B.L. 409 for wrongful
repudiation)78 or in restitution for reasonable remuneration for the value of goods (quantum valebat
claims) or services (quantum meruit claims) supplied at another person's request.79
2. A court may consider other contracts (such as financing or insurance contracts) which are
ostensibly lawful to be so connected with the illegal contract as to be tainted with illegality, in which
case claims under such tainted contracts must fail too.80 Furthermore, claims which might otherwise
be framed in tort (e.g. for breach of duty in negligence), or in restitution (e.g. for unjust enrichment) in
relation to the fulfilment of the prohibited contract, will also fail on the basis that no court will give
effect to such a contract however the cause of action is actually framed.81
3. A court will not allow litigants to benefit from their own illegal conduct, however a claim is framed
and even though the contract might not itself be illegal. It is this principle which essentially underpins
the illegality of unlawful conspiracies to perform ostensibly lawful contracts by illegal means.82
4. Even though a litigant's cause of action would otherwise be defeated by illegality, executed
property dispositions will remain effective notwithstanding any illegality in the contract pursuant to
which they were made.83 The principle has become known as the Bowmakers rule, after the case of
that name (in which machine tools transferred under prohibited hire purchase agreements were
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recovered by the lender from the borrower),84 and is the one general exception to the draconian effect
of contractual illegality under English law. Consequently, in the context of contracts for the sale of
goods, whilst contractual rights, duties and liabilities become void and unenforceable as a result of
illegality, property rights in the goods sold might, nevertheless, pass under English law from seller to
buyer. However, in the context of the REACH prohibitions, note should be taken of Du Parcq L.J.'s
observation that this general exception is itself subject to “one obvious exception … namely, that
class of cases in which the goods claimed are of such a kind that it is unlawful to *J.B.L. 410 deal in
them at all, as for example, obscene books …”,85 or perhaps, by analogy, any goods subject to one or
other of the REACH prohibitions.
5. There is an intricate web of certain defined situations in which litigants can succeed in their claims,
notwithstanding contractual illegality, by arguing that they were non in pari delicto (i.e. not equally at
fault). This has a highly structured meaning under English law. It includes litigants' rights to relief
where they can “make out … [their] … case otherwise than through the medium and by the aid of the
illegal transaction …”,86 as well as permitting restitutionary claims to prevent unjust enrichment in
certain particular circumstances. These circumstances include those where the party seeking relief is
within the class of persons whose interests the statute in question was seeking to protect.87
Alternatively, those who would have been entitled to have had the contract rescinded in any event by
circumstances such as fraudulent misrepresentation, duress, undue influence, etc. may claim
restitutionary relief.88 Such restitutionary claims are subject to the court being satisfied of the following
various circumstances: that the equitable grounds for the relief sought are satisfied89 ; that such relief,
if granted, would not have the same effect as enforcement of the illegal contract90 ; and that the party
obtaining relief would not thereby benefit from their own criminal conduct91 (excepting where such
benefit is sought under doctrine of locus poenitentiae by which a party repenting of, and seeking to
withdraw from, an illegal contract before it is performed is entitled to recover their own property).92
There is some suggestion in more recent authorities that parties not “equally culpable” should also be
entitled to pursue claims for restitution, and in tort for damages, in respect *J.B.L. 411 of losses
suffered by reason of contractual remuneration being irrecoverable under illegal contracts,93 but there
is, as yet, no certainty of entitlement for such persons.94
Lawyers may refer routinely to the doctrine of severance (by which judges are able to sever from
contracts provisions which are void as being against public policy when the offending provision or
obligation is not the entire consideration moving from one party to another),95 but courts have resisted
the application of this principle to contracts rendered illegal by reason of statutory contraventions
where “the illegality is criminal, or contra bonos mores”.96
Since, with REACH, we are concerned with EU and not UK legislation, this complex common law
structure can only take effect insofar as such structure is itself compliant with EU law. This will be
dependent not only on the extent to which the EU Courts accord direct effect to the statutory duties
arising pursuant to REACH, but also on what the EU Courts will require of national domestic law to
ensure the effectiveness of REACH. Leaving such issues on one side for the moment, REACH
appears to raise the prospect of the illegality barrier being raised under English law in respect of any
sale and purchase contract in a supply chain for goods involving unregistered substances which are
required to be registered, or registered substances requiring use authorisation where the use is not
unauthorised, or restricted substances where the conditions of the restriction are not complied with.
If the sale and purchase contract is rendered illegal then the risk is that English law would regard an
ancillary contract for the financing, insurance or even carriage of the prohibited goods as being
tainted with illegality and unenforceable as a result. Obviously this would be the case where all parties
to the ancillary contracts are aware of the illegality in the underlying supply contract and conspire to
achieve that illegal purpose.97 It could also be the case where there is no such conspiracy, but the
ancillary finance, insurance and/or carriage contracts are considered to have the effect of facilitating
the illegal purpose. In the latter case contractual illegality might arise even though all of the parties to
such contracts are wholly unaware of the illegality. As Staughton L.J. put it, when addressing the
issue in *J.B.L. 412 connection with letters of credit, “that would not be because the letters of credit
were themselves illegal, but because they were being used to carry out an illegal transaction”.98
All the REACH prohibitions are directed towards the supply of goods. This is clear from the prohibition
being expressed as including “supplying or making available … [to a] … third party” the prohibited
goods. Accordingly, claims for payment under letters of credit issued to secure payment for such
prohibited supply, or even under credit insurance obtained for a similar purpose, might be refused
under English law by reason of the payment guarantee being considered unenforceable through
being tainted with illegality. Contracts of carriage, or for goods in transit insurance, appear far less
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susceptible to allegations of taint in the absence of an illegal conspiracy, as REACH does not prohibit
the physical carriage of the goods from A to B, only the supply of the goods into, or to others within,
the EEA market.99 While any transfer of title effected under such illegal contracts might remain
effective notwithstanding such illegality, such title transfer might be defeated by the possible
application of the “exception to the exception” proposed by Du Parcq L.J. in relation to the rule in the
Bowmakers case.100
REACH potential to inform content of contractual and tortious duties
In contracts for the sale and purchase of goods sellers will undertake certain express obligations to be
fulfilled by them in relation to the goods and may also have to satisfy certain obligations implied under
the applicable law. In the case of EU legislation such as REACH, these express and/or implied
contractual terms are required to operate not merely against a background of national domestic law,
but also the provisions of EU law requiring legislative interventions by the EU to be applied by
national courts in compliance with the EU law requirement of effectiveness.
Under English law, subject to goods being sold in the course of a business and to the operation of
contractual exclusions, English law implies obligations that goods supplied should be fit for their
purpose. These obligations require that the goods are fit both for all purposes for which those goods
are commonly supplied (so as to fulfil the requirement of “satisfactory quality”),101 and for any
particular purpose for which they were expressly purchased.102 If the seller is aware that goods are
being purchased for a particular market (e.g. the EEA) and has agreed to sell goods which are
appropriate for that market then, clearly, the seller would be in breach of these generally implied
obligations were it to either provide goods not compliant with the known requirements of that market
or provide compliant goods with non-compliant information (since, under English law, goods can be
rendered unfit for their intended purpose, or of unsatisfactory quality for any common *J.B.L. 413
purpose, by reason of the information which accompanies them).103 Conversely, there would be no
breach if the goods were sold generally and not for a particular market as the standard of
performance is relative to the contractually required performance.104 Similarly, general obligations to
exercise reasonable care may be imposed by the contract either expressly or by implication,105
importing the possibility that breach of the statutory obligations by a seller might be considered
evidence of breach by the seller of any such implied contractual duty.106 However, it is most unlikely
that any breach on the part of a buyer of those statutory obligations imposed on buyers by arts 34-37
of REACH could be considered as evidence of breach of any implied contractual term, unless
extraordinarily an appropriate contractual term was to be implied by the common law in the context of
the exercise of judicial discretion in all the circumstances of any particular case. Further, or
alternatively, express terms requiring compliance with all applicable REACH obligations could be
imposed by the contract on one, other or both of the seller (as to the goods and the required risk
information), or the buyer (as to the use of the goods and the required use information). Such express
obligations could be expressed generally, or refer to the REACH obligations specifically.
Any such implied or express terms have the potential to give contractual effect to some or all of the
REACH information obligations imposed on sellers by REACH arts 31-33 and any such express terms
have potential to give contractual effect to those REACH information obligations imposed on buyers
by arts 34-37. However, any such contractual provision (whether imposed on the seller or the buyer)
would ordinarily be defeated in the event of any illegality arising under English law pursuant to the
REACH prohibitions at arts 5, 56 and 67.
REACH potential to create tortious rights
Breach of UK legislation does not inevitably lead to any private civil law liability in tort, although where
such liability arises it may be co-extensive with liabilities arising in contract.107 The tort of breach of
statutory duty only lies, according to English common law, when the legislature not only imposes a
statutory duty on some person or persons, but can be proved to have intended that private law rights
of action be afforded to those claiming against any such person acting in breach of the statutory duty
imposed on them.108 It must also be clear that the legislature actually intended to confer a cause of
action for breach of statutory duty on the claimant particularly, or as a member of a particular class,
either for general relief *J.B.L. 414 or for certain particularly specified relief.109 UK statutes contain
many examples of such rights being expressly provided for by UK statutory draughtspersons using
one or other of the following techniques:
• providing for breach to be actionable by way of claims for breach of statutory duty; or
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• making specific provision for particular remedies for particular classes of persons; or
• creating general rights for damages or compensation or in tort.110
Difficult issues of statutory construction arise, however, where the UK statute makes no such express
provision and the court needs to ascertain the intention of the UK legislature as to the capacity of the
statute to create a civil right of action. This is the position under REACH. Neither the EC REACH
legislation itself, nor the REACH Enforcement Regulations 2008111 (made by the UK Government
pursuant to art. 126 of REACH), address what, if any, civil rights of redress might lie as between
contracting parties. However, English law now has a well-developed set of principles pursuant to
which the extent of such rights, if any, must be determined. The overriding principle, as described by
Lord Simonds in Cutler v Wandsworth Stadium Ltd , is that “the answer must depend on a
consideration of the whole Act and the circumstances, including the pre-existing law, in which it was
enacted” and the English common law provides clear indications “which point with more or less force
to the one answer or the other”.112
These indications are to the effect that “if a statutory duty is prescribed but no remedy by way of
penalty or otherwise for its breach is imposed, it can be assumed that a right of civil action accrues to
the person who is damnified by the breach”, since otherwise the legislation would merely be just a
“pious aspiration”.113 Since individuals commonly now have rights to seek judicial review of the actions
of public authorities, this indication is, perhaps, of little relevance--except where the failure in statutory
compliance is attributable to someone other than the state. Clearly no such inference could be made
regarding REACH following the imposition of public criminal and public civil sanctions by the REACH
Enforcement Regulations 2008 for non-compliance with REACH.
Pointing the other way is the “general rule”114 that, “where an Act creates an obligation, and enforces
the performance in a specified manner … that performance cannot be enforced in any other manner”.
115 This general rule has two recognised exceptions: first, where the statutory duty was imposed to
benefit or protect a *J.B.L. 415 particular class of individuals,116 and, second, where the statute
creates a public right (i.e. a right to be enjoyed by all UK citizens) and one or more of those citizens
suffers “particular, direct and substantial” damage “other and different from that which was common to
all the rest of the public”.117 It is clear, as Lord Jauncy noted in Hague,118 that such exceptions only
apply when it appears “upon the true construction of the legislation in question that the intention was
to confer on members of the protected class a cause of action sounding in damages occasioned by
the breach”.119 It is that principle which should be described as the overriding rule.
Accordingly, except where a UK statute makes express provision for civil claims, non-contractual civil
liability is a most unlikely consequence of regulatory breach. There is no presumption that the
legislature intends to give a private right of action in tort simply because the legislation protects some
particular class of individuals, and civil law claims for breach of statutory duty cannot be created from
a statutory duty not intended by the legislature to be owed to individuals.120 Where civil claims for
breach of statutory duty do lie, it is the statute rather than the common law that will control the
standard of care and the extent of the losses that can be recovered by reason of breach.121 These
principles of English law, were they to be applied unconstrained by the EU law principle of
effectiveness, could be expected to operate so as to prevent any breach of the statutory obligations
imposed by REACH on contracting parties being actionable per se by way of private civil action
(otherwise than pursuant to contractual obligation) whether by way of claim or defence. However, any
certainty provided by the common law in this respect can only be preserved subject to the application
of the EU law principle of effectiveness.
Impact of EU law as to the effect of reach under English law
If the REACH prohibitions and REACH information obligations are interpreted as giving rise to “direct
effects” within the various national laws of EEA states, the normal principles of English law would take
effect subject to the EU law principles of equivalence and effectiveness. Judicial application of
equivalence requires little more than the non-discriminatory application of EU legislation to ensure it is
as effective as a similar right arising under domestic national law. The difficulty for national courts in
applying this principle lies not in determining the extent of the sanctions to be applied, but in
determining when to apply which sanction, as the doctrine of equivalence only has application when
the rights created by EU law and national domestic law are similar.122 Judicial application of
effectiveness requires English courts to ensure that the EU legislation is effectively *J.B.L. 416
applied in the achievement of its essential purposes and a twofold inquiry by the EU Courts has been
noted in this respect: first, that of ensuring that Member States effectively enforce compliance with EU
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law and, second, that of ensuring effective judicial protection for those disadvantaged by breach of
EU law.123 It has been suggested124 that, while the principle of effectiveness was originally developed
by the ECJ in such cases as Van Gend en Loos to ensure effective compliance by Member States,125
the need for effective judicial protection has underpinned the effectiveness principle in the more
recent cases where the principle has been applied in the context of competition law.126 Coupled with
the EU law requirements for the primacy (or supremacy) of EU law over national law,127 and for
conformity of national law with EU law (placing an interpretative duty on all organs of the Member
States, and in particular on national courts, to interpret the entirety of national law so that it conforms
with the requirements of EU law),128 the requirement of effectiveness creates a potent brew capable of
undermining the contractual certainty that has been the hallmark of English common law for
contracting parties.129
The EU Courts have, by judgments applying effectiveness in a series of cases, effectively reserved to
themselves the discretion to consider any national law provision, or omission, an obstacle either to
the effective fulfilment of the aims of EU legislation or to the effective protection of those
disadvantaged by non-compliance with EU legislation.130 The development of the effectiveness
principle has been in response to ad hoc referrals under TFEU art.267 (ex EC art.234) with the result
that little certainty attends its potential scope and impact. The principle of effectiveness has been
applied by the EU Courts, strictly in the context of the particular issues then before them, to require
national law to afford certain private civil remedies in particular circumstances for breach of EU
legislation. Some of the rights arising in consequence can be seen to be distinct from those rights
which would have arisen under English law for breach of UK legislation. In this context particular
reference can be made to the following rights: *J.B.L. 417 the right to injunctive relief and damages
by private civil action notwithstanding the existence of public law sanctions131 ; the right of persons
disadvantaged by breach of EU law to be able to seek compensation for their loss of profit plus
interest in the absence of express statutory provision irrespective of the provisions of national
domestic law132 ; the recognition of contractual invalidity arising from breach of EU law resulting in
affected contracts being of no effect whatever, and being incapable of any effect (as between
contracting parties, or with third parties) whether in the past or the future133 ; and the right of any
person without significant responsibility for the breach of statutory obligations arising under EU law to
claim compensation for their losses notwithstanding the invalidity of the contract pursuant to which
those losses have been incurred.134
In the case of REACH the application of the effectiveness principle might result in a variety of
outcomes that from an English common law perspective might be considered unlikely, such as: rights
to claim in tort for breach of statutory duty for failure to comply with the REACH information
obligations (or, indeed, the registration or authorisation obligations); rights to further pecuniary and/or
non-pecuniary relief additional to the relief otherwise available under national law for such claims135 ;
and rights for parties to illegal contracts, without “significant responsibility” for the breach of EU law
giving rise to such illegality, to seek contractual relief unencumbered by the illegality.136 Perhaps it is
even possible that the rule in Bowmakers137 case that the passing of legal title under a contract invalid
by reason of illegality might be considered to obstruct the effectiveness of EU legislation.138 Certainly
the principle of effectiveness has already resulted in breach of EU legislation giving rise, in claims
made before the English courts, to the availability of English law remedies where they would not have
been available had the breach been in respect of national UK legislation.139
*J.B.L. 418 Where does this analysis leave contracting parties? Obligations under REACH are
clearly placed on manufacturers, producers, importers and/or downstream users within the EEA.140
There seems little reason to assume that a statutory obligation imposed by REACH on one party will
be considered capable of delegation to someone else,141 and this, and the risk of illegality, may
undermine reliance upon express or implied terms to transfer risks of non-compliance, and may even
undermine express generic provisions purporting to exclude or limit liability for regulatory
non-compliance. This appears to leave sellers and buyers to manage, as best they can, the risk of
non-compliance with REACH in their own contractual relationships by: the exercise of careful
management and supervision, not only over their own compliance practices but also over the
compliance practices of others within their supply and distribution chains; the careful drafting of sale
and purchase contracts, so that statutory duties arising under REACH are reinforced by express
contractual warranties; and the negotiation of appropriate suspensive conditions facilitating the
suspension of any contractual supply obligation otherwise contravening REACH irrespective of fault.
Should they fail to do so, then the certainty they might look for in those contracts will be exposed to
the vagaries surrounding the interpretation and application of REACH pursuant to EU law and the
reverberations of any direct effect of REACH within the applicable national law, as reinterpreted by
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the elastic EU law concept of effectiveness. Even though English law may strive towards achieving
certain predictable outcomes for honest contracting parties,142 EU law has no such direction of travel
and the doctrine of legal certainty in EU jurisprudence is confined to that of securing the legitimate
expectations of those exposed to public sanctions by retroactive, or inconsistent, decisions of
Member States and EU institutions.143 Being thus so confined to the field of public administrative law,
it can provide little comfort to contracting parties in the management of their own autonomous
relationships.
Conclusion
The extent of the regulatory control exercised by REACH over the sale and purchase of substances,
preparations and articles is broad and far ranging. REACH imposes many duties on contracting
parties involved in the sale and purchase of goods. These concern the following diverse matters: the
assessment of the chemical composition, functional characteristics and hazards of the goods to be
supplied; *J.B.L. 419 the uses to which those goods are to be put; and the information to be
exchanged (not only as between the parties themselves; but also by them with others involved in the
supply chain, and with the regulatory authority ECHA). Most significantly, REACH also prohibits the
supply of certain goods.
Commercial certainty surrounding the consequences of non-compliance with REACH must await
elucidationby the EU Courts. This elucidation can only emerge over time in the course of the
successive references to be anticipated from national courts under the TFEU art.267 (ex EC art.234)
procedure. Many such references will be needed to determine not only which of the highly complex
provisions of REACH have direct effects, but also what the EU law principle of effectiveness will
actually require of contractual and tortious sanctions under national domestic legal systems, in the
enforcement of those REACH provisions apparently capable of direct effects. While the impact of any
breach of UK legislation on autonomous contractual relationships is confined by the English common
law and, generally, is predictable (following thorough textual and contextual evaluation of the relevant
statutory and contractual obligations), the impact of regulatory breach of EU legislation on such
autonomous contractual relationships is unconfined and unpredictable. Furthermore, while English
law strives for contractual certainty; the EU doctrine of legal certainty is so limited as to afford
contracting parties little assistance in this private autonomous realm. As a result, English law (alike
with the national law of the other EEA legal systems), may be prevented from fulfilling contracting
parties' legitimate commercial expectations within the context of those industrial supply arrangements
that include goods attracting statutory regulation under REACH.
This article expands and develops themes first explored by the author in a paper entitled “The Effect
of REACH in Commercial Contracts”, presented to the REACH Europe 2008 conference held on
September 16-18, 2008 at Park Plaza, Antwerp, Belgium and published on September 16, 2008 in
Conference Proceedings by Smithers Rapra Ltd, Shawbury, Shrewsbury, Shropshire, SY4 4NR, UK
(ISBN: 978-1-84735-073-2; Paper 14; pp.1-10).
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Regulation 1907/2006 concerning the registration, evaluation, authorisation and restriction of chemical substances. In consequence of the
REACH regulatory environment for such substances, the EU requirements as to their classification, labelling and packaging have been
replaced by the CLP Regulation (Regulation 1272/2008). It should be noted that the CLP Regulation (e.g. see CLP art.4) imposes
additional statutory obligations and prohibitions on contracting parties in relation to substances regulated by REACH.
2.
TFEU art.288 (ex art.249 EC).
3.
The 27 Member States of the European Union; plus Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein by virtue of European Economic Area Agreement
of March 17, 1993, which entered into force on January 1, 1994.
4.
Being “binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States” under TFEU art.288 (ex art.249 EC) as a generally applicable
EU Regulation.
5.
Substances are defined as “any chemical element and its compounds in the natural state or obtained by any manufacturing process …”;
preparations as any “mixture or solution composed of two or more substances …” and an article as any “object which during production is
given a special shape, surface or design which determines its function to a greater degree than does its chemical composition …”.
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6.
The exceptions are detailed in REACH art.2 and annexes IV and V to the legislation. As A.G. Kokott commented, at [40] of his Opinion in
SPCMSA v DEFRA (C-558/07), July 7, 2009, exceptions to EU law requirements must, as a matter of general principle, be subjected to a
strict interpretation.
7.
The “downstream user” is defined by REACH art.3 as any EU established person, other than the manufacturer or importer of the
substance (unless the substance is already registered by a non-EU manufacturer through an only representative, when the importer
should apparently be considered a downstream user--see the SPCM case, July 7, 2009, at [66] of the ECJ judgment), using a substance
in industrial or professional activities (or being a re-importer of such substances) excluding distributors and consumers.
8.
REACH art. 126 simply provides for “effective, proportionate and dissuasive” penalties to be laid down by Member States by December 1,
2008. The UK Government has enacted the REACH Enforcement Regulations 2008 (SI 2008/2852) pursuant to this obligation.
9.
Humblet v Belgian State (6/60) [1960] E.C.R. 559 at 575.
10.
This being apparent from paras 1, 2, 17, 18, 56 and 58 of the Preamble.
11.
Defined as “phase-in substances” by REACH art.3.
12.
The criteria being that the substance should be already listed in the European Inventory of Existing Commercial Chemical Substances
(EINECS); or else manufactured in the EU some time after June 1, 1992 and before June 1, 2007, but not placed on the market; or not a
polymer as defined by REACH and previously placed on the EEA market before June 1, 2007 and considered to have been notified in
accordance with art.8(1) Directive 67/548.
13.
REACH art.28 providing for pre-registration by substance name and requisite identity code, registrant name, envisaged registration
deadline and tonnage band.
14.
Defined by reference to Council Directive 2006/12.
15.
Such exemptions are limited to medicinal products for human or veterinary use and food or feedingstuffs for human or animal
consumption.
16.
Defined by REACH art.3(15a) as an intermediate not intentionally removed during synthesis, an intermediate being defined as a
substance manufactured for the purposes of transformation, by synthesis in chemical reactions, into another substance.
17.
Substances as diverse as limestone and corn oil are, by reason of inclusion in Annex IV, excluded from REACH.
18.
Substances as diverse as crude oil and helium are exempted (unless chemically modified) by being referenced in Annex V to REACH. In
addition, Annex V identifies other substances not by name but by reference to a general description of the chemical reactions by which
they were created, i.e. reactions that can be loosely described as occurring naturally during manufacturing or other processes.
19.
An intermediate is an on-site isolated intermediate, when the process of manufacturing and synthesis takes place on the same site, while
a transported isolated intermediate is where such substances are transported between sites. The definition of polymers at REACH
art.3(5) raises issues of particular complexity discussed in fn.43 below.
20.
Defined by art. 1(1a) of Directive 2006/12 as “any substance or object … which the holder discards or intends or is required to discard”
also falling within one of the categories appearing in Annex 1 to that Directive.
21.
ECHA Guidance on requirements for substances in articles released in May 2008 and available from the ECHA website at:
http://echa.europa.eu/reach/fact_sheet_en.asp [Accessed April 30, 2010].
22.
ECHA Guidance, 2008, p.27, available from the ECHA website at: http://echa.europa.eu/reach/fact_sheet_en.asp [Accessed April 30,
2010].
23.
ECHA Guidance, 2008, p.29, available from the ECHA website at: http://echa.europa.eu/reach/fact_sheet_en.asp [Accessed April 30,
2010].
24.
As established by the EU Courts in numerous cases, including Van Gend en Loos (26/62) [1963] E.C.R. 13; Costa v ENEL (6/64) [1964]
E.C.R. 585; and Simmenthal SpA (106/77) [1978] E.C.R. 629, in respect of EU legislation having direct effects.
25.
At least where the EU legislation should be regarded as being “a fundamental provision which is essential for the accomplishment of the
tasks entrusted to the Community and, in particular, for the functioning of the internal market” as the ECJ described the restraint of
anti-competitive practices under EC Treaty art. 81 (now TFEU art. 101) at [36] of its judgment in Eco Swiss China Time Ltd v Benetton
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International NV (C-126/97) [1999] E.C.R. I-3055 in deciding that art.81 EC Treaty constituted a rule of public policy that a national court
was obliged to respect by refusing to enforce an arbitral award that would offend the prohibition arising under EU law.
26.
See the judgment in Simmenthal [1978] E.C.R. 629 at [24] and, as far as the laws of the UK are concerned, the judgment of Lord Bridge
in Factortame Ltd v Secretary of State for Transport (No.2) [1991] 1 A.C. 603 HL at 658.
27.
Telemarsicabruzzo SpA v Circostel, Ministero delle Poste e Telecommunicazioni andMinisterio della Difesa (C-320-322/90) [1993] E.C.R.
I-393.
28.
Gasparini (C-467/04) [2006] E.C.R. I-9199; although such dispute may arise in the context of judicial review proceedings challenging
national implementation of community law; see below fn. 31.
29.
In the seminal judgment in Van Gend en Loos [1963] E.C.R. 13.
30.
Muñoz v Frumar Ltd(C-253/00) [2002] E.C.R. I-7289.
31.
One such reference already made is SPCM SA v DEFRA (C-558/07), where the ECJ gave judgment on July 7, 2009. The reference
arose out of an application for judicial review of actions to be taken by the UK Government to punish non-compliance with REACH. In the
course of such proceedings, the claimants sought to: challenge before the English High Court the legality of REACH; and to obtain
definitive interpretations of REACH art. 6.3 as to the duties on manufacturers and importers to register reacted monomers given that the
registration of the derivative polymer is excepted. The ECJ proceeded to uphold the legality of REACH and to give authoritative
interpretation of those duties, as discussed in fnn.39 and 43 below.
32.
See Muñoz [2002] E.C.R. I-7289.
33.
As art. 126 of REACH does as regards the penalties to be introduced by Member States for breach.
34.
Advocate-General's opinion in Muñoz [2002] E.C.R. I-7289 at [46]-[47].
35. [2002] E.C.R. I-7289 at [27]-[32] of the judgment.
36.
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art.3 as including retailers who “only stores and places on the market” this would seem to embrace all suppliers to downstream users
56.
Eco Swiss China Time v Benetton [1999] E.C.R. I-3055.
57.
See the ECJ's judgment in Manfredi v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni [2006] E.C.R. I-6619 at [93].
58.
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by Baron Parke in Cope v Rowlands (1836) 2 M. & W. 149 in the following terms: “It is perfectly settled, that where the contract which the
plaintiff seeks to enforce, be it express or implied, is expressly or by implication forbidden by the common or statute law, no court will lend
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illegal when the required contractual performance was that of loading alongside in London and, in the event, the hay was transhipped in
London and exported elsewhere.
71.
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See Mahmoud and Ispahani, Re [1921] 2 K.B. 716 CA where the sale of linseed oil without a licence was prohibited and the contract was
held illegal by the Court of Appeal even though responsibility for the failure lay with the vendor rather than the purchaser. Accordingly the
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